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Outsourcing as a strategic business decision has been a prevalent business practice in 
the sport industry, and as a result has been receiving increasing academic attention by 
scholars in sport management. In many cases, the academic attention has been 
focused on the multi-billion dollar hyper-commercialized sport industry, like 
professional and intercollegiate sport in the United States. However, outsourcing has 
infiltrated the world of amateur sport, for instance youth sports programs (YSP), as 
well. In spite of a growing use of outsourcing as a viable business strategy within a 
community based sport setting, efforts to understand outsourcing in amateur sport 
have so far gone unheeded in academia. Accordingly, this study examined 
outsourcing YSP by city-owned recreation centers (CORC). The motivation of 
outsourcing and the risk of outsourcing were analyzed using a multiple case study 
approach. The results of this study argue that combination of both economic and 
strategic management views are effective ways to understand outsourcing strategies 
in an amateur sport setting. The findings of this study provide both theoretical and 
practical implications. Furthermore, to contribute to the body of literature, the 
findings of this study are compared with previous sport management outsourcing 
literature to provide a comprehensive understanding of outsourcing.  
 
 
istorically, youth sport in America 
has been a popular form of activity 
(Coakley, 1979), and the youth 
sport participation for some sports is 
consistently increasing. Many major sports 
governing bodies have started to implement 
and run very attractive initiatives designed 
to promote youth sports participation 
across the country (e.g., Gray, 2015; Missal, 
2015; Thomas, 2015). This trend by the 
major sports governing bodies presents a 
serious competition to many sport 
organizations like city-owned recreation 
centers (CORC), because they also sell 
H 
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youth sports programs. Also, CORC are 
facing huge challenges to be financially 
sustainable against major sports governing 
bodies that have better financial, physical, 
human, and informational resources than 
CORC. Additionally, many CORC have a 
relatively small number of full time 
employees and face a budgetary constraint 
as the financial support from cities is 
generally decreasing. As a result, many 
CORC are forced to adapt in a new and 
challenging market place. One of the 
notable changes is outsourcing YSP to 
independent contractors (Park and 
Recreation National Database Report, 
2014). The National Alliance for Youth 
Sports (2012) also noticed recent trend 
addressing that “In recent years there has 
been a huge shift in youth sports with more 
and more municipalities outsourcing 
programs to independent volunteer-led 
organizations.” 
While a growing number of the cities 
are employing outsourcing strategies for 
their YSP, there has been no academic 
effort to understand outsourcing in terms of 
motivation, risks, and its mitigation 
strategies. Thus, given the paucity of 
investigation toward outsourcing YSP to 
better understand current amateur sport 
management, this study seeks to investigate 
why CORC outsource their YSP to a third 
party, and what outsourcing risks they have 
and how they mitigate those risks.  
Such investigation is necessary for 
several reasons. First, outsourcing as a 
subject matter has been examined 
frequently in the context of sport 
management. However, a majority of 
published studies focused on a highly 
commercialized professional (Burden & Li, 
2009; Lee, 2010; Lee & Lee, 2011) or an 
intercollegiate sport setting (Bouchert, 2010; 
Burden & Li, 2005; 2003; Burden, Li, Masiu, 
& Savini, 2006; Lee & Walsh, 2011; Li & 
Burden, 2004; 2002; Walker, Sartore, & 
Taylor, 2009; Zullo, 2013a; 2013b), which 
can be characterized by commodification, 
commercialization, and marketization. 
Scholars are belated to understand 
outsourcing in the context of YSP by 
CORC. It is believed that this study will 
contribute to the body of overall sport 
management literature in a unique way by 
focusing on the amateur sport context. 
Secondly, as Davis-Blake and Broschak 
(2009) argued, outsourcing is a complex, 
multi-dimensional, and heterogeneous 
practice depending on a wide range of 
variables affecting outsourcing success or 
failure. The outsourcing decision, as well as 
the operation, is much more complicated 
nowadays, so the traditional “make or buy 
decision” is gone. Academic efforts to 
understand outsourcing in areas where little 
exploration and theory exist will contribute 
to the body of sport management and 
outsourcing literature. Also, to contribute to 
the body of literature, the findings of this 
study are compared with previous sport 
management outsourcing literature to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of 
outsourcing.  
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Literature Review 
This study has three research questions 
that are developed by previous literature: 
What motivates the outsourcing of YSP?; 
What are the outsourcing risks to YSP?; 
And, what are the risk mitigation strategies 
used by YSP?  
 
Outsourcing Motivation/Risks 
Outsourcing as a strategic business 
decision has been used globally for many 
years across many different industries, and 
according to the Statista (2013), in 2013 the 
market size of the outsourced service was 
close to 83 billion dollars. Busi (2008) 
described outsourcing as a business strategy 
by an organization that contracts out one of 
its operations to an external and 
independent third party. For years, in 
academic literature such as information 
system, a vast amount of research from a 
number of different academic fields has 
been accumulated to better understand 
outsourcing. 
Academic focus of outsourcing studies 
has become more diverse, and scholars have 
discussed different aspects of outsourcing 
(see Lacity, Solomon, Yan, & Willcocks, 
2011) such as transaction attributes (e.g., 
process complexity, risk, transaction costs, 
etc.), client firms (e.g., client size or age, 
prior firm performance, etc.), relational 
governance (communication, relationship 
quality, etc.), and outsourcing decisions 
(e.g., make or buy, multi-sourcing, etc.). 
Among these, outsourcing motivation and 
outsourcing risks are two of the most 
studied topics in literature (see Lacity et al., 
2011). Regarding outsourcing motivation, 
several motivations have been identified 
such as cost reduction, focus on core 
activities, access to the resources/skills, 
performance improvement, innovation, and 
development of employees (see Lacity et al., 
2011). There are two major outsourcing 
motivations: cost-driven and performance-
driven outsourcing (Kremic, Tukel, & Rom, 
2006). Cost-driven outsourcing focuses on a 
cost reduction perspective. Minimization of 
indirect costs, such as fewer employees, is a 
primary example. Performance-driven 
outsourcing is an approach from a quality 
improvement point of view, and many 
organizations expect access to 
expertise/resources (e.g., Baldwing, Irani, & 
Love 2001; Elmuti & Kathawala, 2000; 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2000; Kumar & 
Eickhoff, 2006; Mukherji & Ramachandran, 
2007) and expect professional development, 
like knowledge acquisition, through 
outsourcing (e.g., Barthélemy & Quélin, 
2006; Zach & Singh, 2010). However, more 
often than not, a combination of these two 
motivations seems more common for 
outsourcing motivation.  
Despite the benefits outsourcing brings 
to the organization (Fill & Visser, 2000; 
Kremic et al., 2006), the outsourcing 
decision is not a panacea for all 
organizations as there are always risks 
associated with outsourcing. Previous 
outsourcing studies identified and discussed 
outsourcing risks and the necessary 
managerial actions to handle them (e.g., 
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Aron, Clemons, & Reddi, 2005; Bahli & 
Rivard, 2003; Earl, 1996; Kremic et al., 
2006; Willcocks, Lacity, & Kern, 1999). 
Some of the risks are inherent in that those 
risks are present in any business, such as a 
hidden cost like a search for a service 
provider or contract negotiation with a 
service provider, a potential loss of 
control/competence, changing 
environment, conflict of interest and 
relationship issue. Also, outsourcing may 
lead to distrust toward the service provider 
and diminish employee’s commitment 
(Bhagwati, Panagariya, & Srinivasan, 2004). 
In addition, other types of risks related to 
various managerial risks include poor 
contract details, poor communication, and 
poor monitoring (see Kremic et al., 2006).  
For a risk mitigation strategy, Key 
(1995) suggested a group of experts 
knowledgeable about not only outsourcing 
but its risks should manage a service 
provider’s performance. In reality, 
outsourcing risks can occur in many 
different ways. One of the risks as a result 
of action by the service provider is called 
shrinking (Aron et al., 2005). It is the 
intentional under performance by the 
service provider while still claiming a full 
service fee, and it can stem from deliberate 
effort by individuals, 
untrained/inexperienced staff hiring, and 
under investment in resources by the service 
provider to get out of the existing contract 
or renew the existing contract (Aron et al., 
2005; Earl, 1996). Shrinking will cause a 
significant and unexpected financial burden 
to the organization as they may have to 
manage the shrinking situations through a 
contract amendment, buyout, and so forth. 
Eventually, managerial risks incur hidden 
costs meaning that two different types of 
risks are very much affecting each other.   
 
Economic View and Strategic 
Management View 
There are several theoretical 
perspectives that discuss outsourcing and 
these theoretical perspectives have been 
proven effective to understand outsourcing. 
According to Cheon, Grover and Teng 
(1995), there are two major theoretical 
frameworks in outsourcing. The first one is 
an economic view based on transaction cost 
theory that emerged as a predominating 
theory to explain outsourcing. Economist 
Ronald Coase introduced the concept of 
transaction cost theory in the 1930s to 
discuss the cost, including time and effort 
incurred for any economic activity, in 
making any transaction in the market system 
(Coase, 1937). Then, it was developed 
further by Williamson in the 1970s. 
According to Williamson’s view, any 
organization has two options for its 
economic activity; in-house performance or 
market mechanism like outsourcing. Either 
option has the cost involved such as 
production costs which consists of both 
direct and indirect cost to produce the good 
or service and other transaction costs 
needed for economic activity such as 
operational and contractual costs 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985). The main focus 
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of the organization’s decision is controlling 
and minimizing transaction costs through 
an external market mechanism if available 
rather than internally within the 
organization (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975; 1985). In the modern business world, 
it is always important to keep the 
transaction costs minimal, and there have 
been many business strategies to achieve it. 
Outsourcing has been proven to be an 
effective business strategy so much so that 
many outsourcing studies have been guided 
by transaction cost theory to explain 
outsourcing motivation (see Bolumole, 
Frankel, & Naslund, 2007). Therefore, this 
framework explains that the organization 
tries to minimize the transaction costs and 
transfer the costs to the external third party 
should the costs arise (Williams, 1975; 
1985).  
While traditional outsourcing studies 
focused more on economics approaches, 
other aspects of organizational behavior 
started to be seriously examined (Silverman, 
1999). The strategic management view 
utilizes a resource based theory to discuss 
how to formulate or implement outsourcing 
strategies for successful outsourcing 
outcomes (Cheon et al., 1995). The theory 
postulates that an organization is basically a 
set of resources and capabilities that are 
treated as strengths (Grant, 1991), and these 
resources and capabilities are important to 
create competitive advantages for any 
organization (Cheon et al., 1995). To discuss 
the resources, Grant (1992) categorized five 
different resources; some are tangible like 
financial and physical resources, and some 
are intangible such as human, technological, 
and reputation. The theory’s underlying 
concept is that the organization can exploit 
the resources through agreement rather than 
extending the organizational boundaries 
(Silverman, 1999). With respect to 
outsourcing, any organizations lacking 
resources can choose options of purchases, 
strategic alliances, or outsourcing to make 
up for the resources and capabilities, and 
that is why this theory can be powerful to 
explain outsourcing (Grant, 1991). Similarly, 
any organizations performing below the 
expected or desired level, outsourcing can 
be a great business strategy to boost the 
effectiveness by taking advantage of the 
resources available externally (Teng, Cheon, 
& Grover, 1995). Whereas these two 
theoretical frameworks are different in 
terms of unit of analysis (transaction vs. 
resources/capabilities) and criterion 
(minimizing costs vs. creating value), they 
complement each other (Espino-Rodriguez 
& Padron-Robaina, 2006).    
 
Sport Management Outsourcing Study 
Outsourcing studies in the sport 
management field are not as prolific as 
general outsourcing literature, but the field 
has started to receive attention from the 
scholars. The topics include marketing 
management (e.g, Burden & Li, 2005; Lee & 
Walsh, 2011; Walker et al., 2009; Zullo, 
2013a), sales management (e.g., Bouchert, 
2010; Lee & Pinheiro, 2014; Zulloa, 2013b), 
and concession management (Lee & Lee, 
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2011). Sport management literature shows 
that performance-driven outsourcing in 
terms of revenue maximization and the 
focus on core competencies are the 
dominant primary outsourcing motivations. 
Burden and Li (2005) also showed the case 
of one Division I athletic department that 
outsources its marketing operations so they 
can instead focus on other activities. 
Recently, Lee and Walsh’s (2011) findings 
from a SWOT and Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) combined model 
demonstrated that a selected athletic 
department in a Division I program 
employed sport marketing outsourcing 
mainly because of performance-driven 
outsourcing motivation. They noted that 
revenue generation through sport marketing 
outsourcing is the most important for 
outsourcing decision making. Another 
influential outsourcing decision making 
factor they identified was the focus on core 
business. By outsourcing, the athletic 
department could and would focus more on 
some other activities such as fundraising, 
media relations, and facility operations. In 
their study, cost control was selected as an 
influential factor, but not as important as 
revenue generation or a focus on core 
activities. Lee and Lee (2011) also identified 
expertise that the service provider can bring 
is one of the major motivations of 
concession management outsourcing along 
with revenue generation and transfer risks. 
So while cost driven outsourcing was also 
identified as a motivation by some other 
studies (Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee & Pinheiro, 
2014; Lee & Walsh, 2011), it appears that 
performance-driven outsourcing is the 
dominating motivation in the context of 
sport management outsourcing.  
Similarly, sport management studies 
identified and discussed outsourcing risks. 
Not only were inherent outsourcing risks 
discussed previously (Bouchert, 2010; 
Burden & Li, 2005; Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee & 
Walsh, 2011), but managerial risks and how 
to mitigate them was also discussed in terms 
of communication (Walker et al., 2009) and 
performance monitoring (Lee & Pinheiro, 
2014; Lee & Lee, 2011). Specifically, Walker 
et al. (2009) noted some potential downfalls 
to outsourced operations such as a 
degrading of service, loss of control by the 
client, service provider selection problem, 
and ineffective communication, and also 
argued that potentially, these risks may 
create an ‘us against them’ dichotomy. 
Overall, outsourcing risks in sport 
management studies are very consistent 
with general outsourcing studies, meaning 
that risks existing in outsourcing are quite 
universal. 
Regarding the theoretical frameworks, 
strategic view appears to be a dominating 
theoretical perspective due to the fact that a 
majority of previous studies viewed 
outsourcing as a strategic opportunity to 
deliberately gain resources from the service 
providers such as financial (Lee & Walsh, 
2011), physical (Lee & Lee, 2011), human 
(Burden & Li, 2005; Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee 
& Pinheiro, 2014; Lee & Walsh, 2011; 
Walker et al., 2009), and technological 
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resources (Lee & Lee, 2011). Thus, 
outsourcing as a business strategy can be an 
impactful business decision as it can provide 
a strategic opportunity for the sport 
organization to obtain competitive 
advantages through resources the service 
provider possesses. Economic view focuses 
on cost control for the organization, and 
some studies in sport management 
outsourcing addressed and/ or investigated 
this view (Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee & Pinheiro, 
2014; Lee & Walsh, 2011). Although these 
studies addressed the economic view, all of 
these studies combined both the economic 
and strategic view to better understand 
outsourcing in the context of sport. Thus, 
while these two views may have different 
approaches to describe, analyze, and 
understand complex nature of outsourcing 
function, sport management outsourcing 
studies do complement each other’s view 
point, which is very consistent with general 
findings of outsourcing studies (Espino-
Rodriguez & Padron-Robaina, 2006).    
 
Outsourcing Youth Sports Programs 
(YSP)  
Understanding outsourcing in amateur 
sport has been somewhat overlooked. 
Therefore, there is not enough academic 
knowledge regarding why CORC outsource 
YSP and how CORC manage outsourcing. 
Traditionally, many outsourcing cases in 
sport focused on professional or 
intercollegiate sport. A couple of 
explanations why the focus on professional 
and collegiate sports outsourcing has been 
dominating in literature instead of amateur 
sports might be possible. One, it is assumed 
that these highly commercialized sports 
receive mass media attention on a daily 
basis, so scholars started to look at 
outsourcing as a subject matter in both a 
professional or collegiate sport context 
(Coakley, 1979). Another possible 
explanation might be the fact that amateur 
sport has not been really operated as a 
business, unlike professional or collegiate 
sport. Outsourcing is viewed as a strategic 
business decision for an organization (Busi, 
2008), and, traditionally, amateur sport has 
not been operated in such a way because it 
probably didn’t need a business strategy for 
its operation. Yet, recently, some studies 
from outside of the United States have 
discussed amateur sport examples that 
outsource physical education or coaching 
classes to the third party (Aoyagi et al., 
2014; Whipp et al., 2011; Williams et al., 
2011). Williams et al. (2011) found that 
many schools in Australia outsource sport 
and physical educational work such as 
outdoor adventure and extra-curricular 
activities. This study found that outsourcing 
motivation includes access to 
expertise/resources and teacher 
professional development. That is to say, 
the schools outsource to get access to 
specialized skills (i.e., how to run sports 
programs, etc.) and resources (i.e., facilities, 
information, etc.) which the school can not 
access without hiring and working with the 
service provider. Whipp et al. (2011) found 
that outsourcing physical education to the 
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specialized service providers allows teachers 
to enhance confidence and skills of teaching 
physical education effectively. As a result, 
teachers from the schools also receive 
educational opportunities for their 
professional development by associating 
with the service provider.  
The primary outsourcing motivation in 
the case of physical education or coaching 
appears to be performance-driven 
outsourcing. This is not inconsistent from 
other previous sport management 
outsourcing studies that support mainly 
performance-driven outsourcing.  
 
Method 
To understand the contemporary 
phenomenon of outsourcing YSP by the 
CORC, a multiple case study approach was 
used for this study (Woodside & Wilson, 
2002). Multiple bounded systems (cases) are 
explored through research questions of how 
and why in the context of contemporary 
and real life contexts (Yin, 2003). To be 
specific, the interview questions are 
modified and developed based on Rottman 
and Lacity (2008) and Mclvor (2009)’s 
interview questions to understand ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions with respect to outsourcing 
decision, outsourcing risks, and its 
mitigation strategies. 
The CORC in this study means a city-
owned recreation center managed by a park 
and recreation department that promotes 
health and well-being of the residents 
through a wide range of programs for 
people of all ages. The CORC used in this 
case study are all from one state in the 
northeast United Sates. This study examined 
three different CORC that are outsourcing 
their YSP. For confidentiality purposes, 
these three CORC will be referred to as 
Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. There are two 
reasons for selecting these particular CORC. 
Firstly, all CORC have been using an 
outsourcing model for years for their YSP 
operations, which will provide ample 
information to understand outsourcing 
motivation, risks, and its mitigation. 
Secondly, the researcher has relationships 
with the CORC, and it is believed that the 
relationship would provide quality of data 
through the interview (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
To collect the data, an in-depth 
interview, follow up email conversation, and 
secondary data (e.g. webpages, brochures, 
online documents) were used. To solicit rich 
data to answer the research questions of this 
study, interviews with the manager in charge 
of YSPs were conducted. Each interview 
lasted between 30 and 45 mintues. A semi-
structured interview with the personnel 
from three CORC highly involved in 
outsourcing YSP, as well as number of 
other resources, such as documents, 
minutes, and newspaper articles pertaining 
to outsourcing YSP, were used for data 
triangulation (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1981).  
 
Case 1 Description  
Case 1 is a 100,000 square-foot health, 
fitness, wellness and recreation center that 
serves the residents of the community. It 
offers a variety of sports programs, leagues, 
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and fitness classes for all ages. The 
recreation center was opened 11 years ago, 
but they have been outsourcing YSP, such 
as basketball, soccer, flag football, tennis, 
and others depending on seasonal demands 
using multiple service providers for at least 
5-6 years. Revenue sharing is 75% to the 
service provider and 25% to Case 1. There 
are only 3 full time employees, including 
one administrative assistant, who are all city 
employees. Furthermore, they have more 
than 80 part-time employees who can only 
work 20 hours maximum per week. As for a 
selection of the service provider, there is no 
official request for proposal (RFP) and 
bidding process. Historically, a potential 
service providers proposed an idea 
informally. For example, ideas such as, “Do 
you have karate classes?” or “Do you have 
tennis classes?” were asked. If the Assistant 
Recreation Facility Manager in Case 1 is 
interested, an official meeting will be 
scheduled to discuss the possibility of 
outsourcing internally. Given that Case 1 is 
family-oriented in its daily operations and 
examines if there is a fit between the two 
organizations. The Assistant Recreation 
Facility Manager said, “They need to 
understand what our mission is, what our 
vision is, and how we conduct the 
business…Don’t want to misrepresent who 
we are because the (YSP) programs still 
represent us. We are city employees so we 
represent the city.” Once all three 
employees agreed that certain service 
providers fit, the Director of the Recreation 
Center presented the outsourcing plans to 
the governing board, which included the 
mayor, city finance director, and legal expert 
of the city. After this presentation, the 
mayor presented the findings to the city 
council. The YSP outsourcing model was 
viewed as a viable business option to 
effectively and efficiently run the CORC, 
because the city clearly understood how 
much the CORC was understaffed. Once 
the service provider was formally selected 
and contracted, the service provider would 
do a background check, hire the instructors, 
advertise YSP, and pay the instructors.  
 
Case 2 Description  
Case 2 provided a diverse array of 
programs that promote fitness, health, 
enjoyment, and education. Case 2 has 
experienced a huge managerial challenge 
because of an economic slowdown. Five 
years ago, the city stated it would 
discontinue financial support to the Case 2, 
and it has forced Case 2 to develop a 
different organizational structure and 
financial plan. While there were no clear 
reasons announced publicly as to why the 
city cut the budget for Case 2, it is quite safe 
to assume that it was to lessen the financial 
burden of the city’s general fund. 
Specifically, utility costs increases ranged 
between 50 and 100 percent, and the CORC 
was in the red for years, which forced the 
city to reconsider its financial support to the 
CORC. Besides, a financial investment in 
the CORC and its YSP is perceived as less 
of a priority by the city. Generally, it is not 
surprising to see the local government cut 
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spending for the recreation center and its 
programs and transfer its spending to other 
local services such as police or fire 
department (Potkewitz, 2008; Sword, 2009). 
Therefore, it underwent a huge downsizing, 
reducing the number of full time employees 
from 20 to only two for the entire 
department, which forced them to 
outsource a lot of their programs including 
YSP. Due to no financial support from the 
city, Case 2 had to generate its own sources 
of revenues and, mainly, it heavily relied on 
program/membership income (90%).  The 
CORC had a record-breaking profit year 
mainly stemming from increased program/ 
membership fees in 2014, sponsorship with 
a regional hospital and other sources of 
revenue such as donation, rentals, vending 
machines, and leases (10%). Since the 
sponsorship deal had just expired, it could 
mean less sponsorship revenue for Case 2. 
Case 2 had a sponsorship with a local 
hospital back in 2009 for three years and 
had another three year sponsorship with 
another regional hospital. Case 2 is now 
seeking another three year sponsorship. 
Case 2 outsources a lot compared to other 
CORC as 70% of their programs are 
currently outsourced to multi service 
providers.  
Case 2 has two different approaches, 
both formal and informal, for their service 
provider recruitment and selection. After 
opening up the RFP locally, about five 
selected prospective bidders were invited 
for presentations. Case 2 selected the 
service provider that could “minimize the 
production costs and benefit the 
community by serving its residents.” For 
instance, Case 2 selected the service 
provider that said “we will also maintain the 
field” for the YSP. Case 2 was able to 
significantly reduce production costs.  
 
Case 3 Description 
 Opened in 2002, Case 3 has an 110,000 
square foot facility that provides 
recreational spaces. Case 3 CORC, a joint 
project between the city and city schools, 
has 6 full time employees. Although they 
receive a small financial subsidy from the 
city, the recreation department is expected 
to be self-financing so they have to generate 
enough revenue for their operation. Case 3 
contracted some of its YSP to only two 
service providers, both out-of-town 
companies, which is a major difference 
from the previous two cases. Case 3 is 
working very closely with the Rec Advisory 
Board that is responsible for working 
collaboratively on the operational and 
managerial matters in accordance with the 
Operating Agreement between the 
organization, city, and city schools. Also the 
Recreation Advisory Committee comprised 
of six members (two city representatives, 
two city school representatives, one 
president at large, and two members at 
large) works closely with the Case 3 as well. 
So many programs including YSP are 
operated internally. Case 3 has an 
application form available anytime for the 
prospective service providers. If there is a 
need for certain YSP, and no in-house 
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option is available, the employees make a 
selection of who will run a specific YSP 
based on a number of decision making 
criteria. A revenue sharing model, the 
service provider’s previous experience, the 
feeling of trustworthiness toward the 
potential service provider are regularly used 
decision making criteria.  
 
Results 
Outsourcing Motivation and Risk  
Case 1 revealed that the major 
motivation for outsourcing YSP was to 
bring expertise and, at the same time, cost 
minimization. A lack of full time employees 
forced them to heavily rely on external 
manpower. Such ideas were represented 
when it was said, “the city pretty much 
understands the way our office works…We 
can’t really offer any additional programing 
with our own staff.” Also the experienced 
service providers are in charge of hiring the 
instructors for each program and running 
the YSP. In doing so, Case 1 does not have 
to spend its time and resources on hiring 
full time city employees and worrying about 
their pensions and health plans. Both cost-
driven and performance-driven outsourcing 
motivation were identified in the Case 1 
situation. In Case 2, the main outsourcing 
drive is also the combination of two. By 
hiring part-timer employees instead of full-
time employees and by hiring the external 
service providers that can bring the 
expertise in the area of YSP, they can “take 
pressure off by outsourcing.” The interview 
showed that Case 2 does not outsource 
revenue-generating programs (e.g. summer 
camps). Instead, they handle those 
programs internally to keep the revenue, yet 
they outsource relatively unimportant YSPs.  
Although outsourcing is not a main 
business model for YSP for Case 3, still 
Case 3 outsources some YSP because of the 
expertise that the service provider can bring 
which Case 3 does not have, and also cost 
reduction. 
Outsourcing motivation between 
general business and sport organizations are 
not inconsistent in that mainly cost driven 
outsourcing and performance driven 
outsourcing are the main motivation. 
According to the interviewees, outsourcing 
motivation is focused on financial 
considerations. According to previous 
outsourcing studies, many small and 
medium-sized companies in America 
outsource their operations partly because of 
the cost saving (Coward, 2003), and, 
consistently, this case study supports that 
small organizations in sport also outsource 
for a cost saving reason. As Table 1 shows, 
the number of the full time city employees 
is extremely small to serve the city, so the 
size of the CORCs forced them to control 
the cost and take advantage of the resource 
available outside of the organization.  
Theoretically, this result can be 
understood from both an economic view 
(transaction cost theory) and strategic 
management view (resource based theory), 
and it appears that there is no one 
dominating theoretical framework to 
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describe outsourcing motivation; rather, it is 
integrated with more than one theory.  
To be specific, all three cases expect 
both production cost and transaction cost 
reduction by exploiting mainly human 
resources from the service providers 
externally available in the market place 
through the contracts. 
Case 1 shared a couple of different 
previous situations where outsourcing risks 
of loss of control occurred, but noted that 
these are quite minor risks for them as it did 
happen very rarely. Case 1 said that “we 
have problem solving and decision making 
power”. Case 2 had not experienced 
outsourcing risks. Case 2 said, “they follow 
our rules” and added that they have built 
and maintained a great relationship with the 
multiple service providers based on mutual 
respect and trust. This helped them to avoid 
any potential outsourcing risks. Case 3 also 
did not really face any outsourcing risks as 
they created and maintained very good 
working relationships with the service 
providers. Also Case 3 added that their 
contract details helped them avoid getting 
involved with any outsourcing risks. 
Overall, all three cases did not experience 
any major outsourcing risks, which is a very 
interesting result in that it is different from 
previous sport management outsourcing 
studies that identified a set of outsourcing 
risks (Bouchert, 2010; Burden & Li, 2005; 
Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee & Pinheiro, 2014; Lee 
& Walsh, 2011; Walker et al., 2009). 
To summarize, the result of this study 
showed that the motivation of YSP 
outsourcing by CORC is explained by the 
combination of both economic and strategic 
management view; as opposed to one single 
dominating view point. As for transaction 
cost theory, this study found cost control is 
the primary motivation for CORC 
outsourcing YSP. Specifically, by 
collaborating with the service provider 
specialized in YSP, CORC can minimize the 
cost of YSP operations. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) noted that the use of combined 
resources across organizations would create 
competitive advantages. To create 
competitive advantages, CORC employ 
outsourcing strategy for YSP operations by 
purchasing service provider’s expertise in 
cost effective way. Accordingly, it shows 
how two theoretical views are 
interconnected with each other.  
As for outsourcing risks, unlike 
previous sport management outsourcing 
studies, this study does not show a huge 
concern of outsourcing risks. The 
interviews showed that outsourcing risks, 
such as lack of communication, conflict of 
interest, or loss of control, were quite 
minimal to be a serious managerial concern. 
Internally, CORC has outsourcing risk 
mitigation plan in place as a form of a 
detailed contract. Externally, the size of two 
organizations (CORC and service provider) 
being so small help them to manage any 
potential risks through effective 
communication and trust developed for 
years through mutual respect between two. 
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Discussion 
All the CORC in this study are facing 
financial challenges as the tax support from 
the city is decreasing. More than likely this 
trend, due to an economic slowdown, 
affected many CORC throughout the 
country. Like Case 3 expressed during the 
interview, the fact that a service oriented 
nonprofit community organization is 
“running a (CORC) business and making 
money to run the program (YSP)” has 
become a major financial and managerial 
challenge. This challenging situation forces 
the CORC to create ways to better manage 
their programs including YSP, and the use 
of outsourcing has become a widespread 
strategy.    
As for outsourcing risks, this case study 
found a mixed result. Case 1 showed a low 
level of concern over such risks based on 
previous incidents whereas Case 2 and 3 did 
not experience such issues. However, all 
three cases were aware of the importance of 
outsourcing risks, so working with the 
service providers to create mutual benefits is 
taken seriously (Narasimhan & Das, 2001). 
It has to be noted that few outsourcing risks 
examples (e.g., loss of control, conflict of 
interest, etc.) were presented during the 
interview. Yet, it was not clear from their 
answers whether or not they were aware of 
other types of outsourcing risks like hidden 
or unexpected costs associated with 
outsourcing such as contract changes, 
monitoring, bidding process, and others 
(Aron et al., 2005; Bahli & Rivard, 2003; 
Earl, 1996; Kremic et al., 2006; Willcocks et 
al., 1999). Knowledge about hidden costs is 
practically important in that the 
organization should not be misguided about 
the benefits of outsourcing as there might 
be hidden costs involved for successful 
outsourcing and, moreover, knowledge 
about hidden costs allowed the organization 
to develop an outsourcing risks mitigation 
mechanism. 
One effective outsourcing mechanism 
that can prevent outsourcing risks from 
occurring is a dual sourcing strategy (Bahli 
& Rivard, 2003; Kern, Wilcocks, & Heck, 
2002). Dual sourcing is one of the risk 
mitigation mechanisms through a multi-
vendor strategy. The multi-vendors strategy 
creates a situation where there is a 
competitive environment between the 
service providers, and it motivates the 
service providers to outperform each other. 
While it may appear these cases use the dual 
sourcing strategies with multiple service 
providers, none of the people interviewed 
addressed or implied a dual sourcing 
strategy as an outsourcing mitigation 
mechanism. This implies that the CORC 
had a dual sourcing model for cost 
minimization by looking for better fits to 
find the service providers. Interestingly, 
given no reported serious concern over 
potential outsourcing risks, it appears to be 
working because it is assumed that the 
service providers are motivated to perform 
well and earn repeated service contracts 
with the CORC.  Given that many service 
providers for this case study come from 
small local organizations, losing the client 
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will hurt their business significantly so they 
always have a performance level they have 
to satisfy. Previous outsourcing studies 
found that the size of the service provider 
does not affect the performance (Lacity et 
al., 2011; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). 
This study supports that notion because 
even though the service providers are 
understaffed, CORC are still very satisfied 
with the performance by the service 
providers. So the results of this study 
support previous studies about the 
relationship between the size of the service 
provider and its performance. While it may 
work as a mitigation mechanism, it could 
work better if the CORC know how to 
strategically utilize the benefits of the dual 
sourcing strategy. Such benefits could 
include how to create friendly competition 
among the service providers or how to 
promote collaborative working relationships 
with all stakeholders involved in 
outsourcing.  
Another potential mitigation plan that 
seems to be working very well is the 
contract details. Previous studies found that 
there is a positive relationship between 
outsourcing contract details and outsourcing 
success (Niranjan, Saxena, Bharadwaj, 2007; 
Wullenweber, Beimborn, Weitzel, & Konig, 
2008). Although all of the cases are 
extremely understaffed, they present great 
examples of taking care of contract details 
which is possible because they are working 
for the city. According to the interviews, it 
seems that contract completeness, such as 
clauses that address and clarify specificity of 
outsourcing details, is covered. Contract 
details are important for CORC in that it 
can act as a quality control mechanism such 
as performance monitoring and problem 
solving procedures. Contract details are vital 
for any potential disputes or litigation 
because the contract details act as a 
managerial guideline for both parties. 
Overall, as Table 2 shows, all cases reported 
that they are highly satisfied with their 
outsourcing mitigation mechanism. 
 
Comparisons to Previous Sport 
Management Outsourcing Research  
 Findings of this multiple case study can 
be compared with the findings from 
previous outsourcing studies in sport 
management. Since previous sport 
management outsourcing research focused 
on only highly commercialized professional 
or intercollegiate sport, the investigation of 
amateur sport focusing on YSP provided by 
the CORC and its outsourcing strategies will 
provide better understanding about 
outsourcing.  
There are several outsourcing 
motivations identified in previous sport 
management outsourcing research: revenue 
generation, quality improvement, cost 
reduction, access to the expertise, a focus 
on core activities, risk mitigation/sharing, 
mimic behavior and, many times, a 
combination of these factors (e.g., Burden 
& Li, 2005; 2009; Lee & Walsh, 2011). 
Many cases, however, of professional or 
intercollegiate sport seek primarily revenue 
maximization or generation through 
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outsourcing; accordingly, the result of this 
study is somewhat different in that revenue 
generation is not the primary outsourcing 
motivation. All cases briefly discussed the 
assignment of generating revenue for 
business, but it is not perceived as a high 
pressure for the cases. Case 3 reported that, 
“I am not sure outsourcing will bring more 
revenues to us”, which was implied by the 
other cases. So, it is quite safe to argue that 
amateur sport organizations providing YSP 
are still not a highly business-oriented sport 
entity in our society. Similarly, Case 2 
reported that to be self-supporting without 
a tax levy or appropriations from the 
general fund is important but not revenue 
generating. Case 2 ended last fiscal year with 
a record-breaking profit but it will fund 
several repairs and improvements within the 
CORC. Therefore, although there is an 
indication of the need to make money in 
order to be a self-financing organization, it 
appears that the operation of the YSP 
through the CORC is based on fulfilling its 
mission by serving the city residents, rather 
than revenue maximization or generation to 
which professional or intercollegiate sports 
are dedicated. 
While previous sport management 
outsourcing studies addressed outsourcing 
risks (Bouchert, 2010; Burden & Li, 2005; 
Lee & Lee, 2011; Lee & Pinheiro, 2014; Lee 
& Walsh, 2011; Walker et al., 2009), all three 
cases reported no major outsourcing risks. 
It is not clear if the cases did not really 
experience outsourcing risks or that risks 
were so minimal that they were not 
addressed. Yet it appears that it is not a 
major managerial or financial issue for the 
cases, which is different from previous sport 
management outsourcing studies. One 
possible answer is that typically the CORC 
prefer to hire either local or regional service 
providers with which they have built 
relationships over the years. This makes 
both parties handle the risks in a very 
effective and efficient way before it 
becomes a serious issue. Another answer 
might be the fact that, as addressed earlier, 
these service providers are fairly small 
organizations, so it is safe to assume that 
they want to avoid any potential issues by 
maintaining good business and professional 
relationships with the CORC. It might be an 
ideal situation for all the cases as they can 
avoid outsourcing risks such as relational 
governance, financial incongruence, and 
conflict of interest with the service 
providers.  
Unlike previous sport management 
outsourcing studies that focus on a 
primarily strategic view to address revenue 
generation, improved quality, or focus on 
other activities through outsourcing, this 
case study can be understood better through 
the combination of both an economic and 
strategic management view as opposed to 
one dominating viewpoint. All cases in this 
study addressed the importance of 
minimizing production and transaction 
costs (economic view) as well as creating 
resources or developing capabilities 
(strategic management view). In other 
words, it may be insufficient or 
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inappropriate to have only one view to fully 
grasp the nature of outsourcing in the 
amateur sport context.  
 
Practical Implications  
Based on the results of this study, there 
are several practical implications for the 
manager from the CORC in terms of how 
to mitigate risks. If CORC decide to 
outsource, the manager should be 
knowledgeable about and familiar with 
outsourcing, outsourcing relationships, and 
most importantly, risks involved to better 
understand overall outsourcing 
implementation. Trust between service 
provider and client as a key influential factor 
for successful outsourcing, has been proven 
in previous research (Gainey & Klass, 2003; 
Oza, Hall, Rainer, & Grey, 2006; Sabherwal, 
1999). Knowledge as well as efforts to 
create and promote good trust-based 
relationships between employees, full or 
part-timers, from the CORCs and service 
providers will serve as a foundation of 
successful outsourcing for the CORCs. To 
be specific, more formal collaborative 
projects between two organizations and 
further informal relationships, such as golf 
outings or retreats for both organizations, 
will create more trust building 
opportunities. In fact, this practical 
implication is relatively easier to implement 
as both the CORC and service providers are 
quite small in terms of staff. As a result, the 
CORC might be able to reduce costs for 
monitoring service provider performance 
which eventually will minimize the risks of 
creating or increasing unexpected or hidden 
costs (Gainey & Klass, 2003; Sabherwal, 
1999). Also, without actual monitoring by 
the CORC, outsourcing risks, such as 
shrinking, can be avoided in many cases 
because trust-based relationships will act as 
an outsourcing risk mitigation mechanism. 
Similar to trust building, effective 
communication is very crucial. 
Communication has been such an important 
concept for successful outsourcing as noted 
by previous outsourcing literature (e.g., 
Chen & Paulraj, 2004; Gainey & Klaas, 
2003; Sen & Shiel, 2006). Sen and Shiel 
(2006) addressed the importance of 
communication between the leaders from 
both the service provider and client to 
better understand each other. Chen and 
Paulraj (2004) noted the importance of not 
only the intra-organizational communication 
but also inter-organizational communication 
because all parties involved in outsourcing 
should communicate effectively and 
efficiently. Walker et al. (2009) specifically 
investigated a communication-commitment 
relationship with regards to sport marketing 
outsourcing within the athletic departments 
in the United States. They found that while 
sport marketing employees perceive sport 
marketing outsourcing as critical, they also 
experienced dissatisfaction with the 
frequency, level, and direction of 
communication, which could potentially 
hurt the business partnership between the 
organizations involved in outsourcing 
(Burden & Li, 2002; Walker et al., 2009).  
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So as a manager of the CORC, it is quite 
important to have good communication 
skills with the multiple stakeholders. Unlike 
many service providers working for the 
athletic departments, all the service 
providers for this study are very small in 
terms of staff, and it makes the managers 
from the CORC communicate more 
effectively and efficiently as they may have 
less frequencies, levels, and directions to go 
through for communication. Practically, 
trust and communication will be important 
from the economic view because these two 
will significantly reduce transaction costs by 
the CORC like service provider search cost, 
service provider selection cost, bargaining 
cost, enforcement cost, and cost of 
coordinating work with the service provider 
(Williamson 1975; 1980).  
Another recommended way of 
monitoring is better management of dual 
sourcing (Bahli & Rivard, 2003). In spite of 
the benefits of the dual sourcing strategy 
from the CORC standpoint, it may be 
understood somewhat differently by the 
service providers. The service providers may 
think their business is always in danger of 
losing the client, and may have concerns 
about how their performance is perceived 
by the CORC. A multiple service providers 
structure may create a competitive 
relationship between them. Therefore, the 
CORC may need to inform and discuss the 
nature of dual sourcing with the service 
providers so that no service providers 
misunderstand the true mission of the dual 
sourcing strategy. Hence, the CORC can 
create the best outcomes out of a dual 
sourcing strategy. For instance, the CORC 
may employ dual sourcing strategy for YSP 
for soccer. Soccer programs for very young 
players may go to one service provider that 
specializes in youth skill development, and 
the program for older players goes to 
another service provider that may have 
more expertise in that age level with more 
advanced skills development.  
Lastly, while outsourcing YSP is 
perceived satisfactorily by the CORC 
according to the interviews, there have been 
no comments about how the service 
provider’s performance is measured for 
internal review. It seems, however, that the 
CORC simply assume outsourcing is 
working. Having formally structured 
performance measure metrics will be helpful 
for an outsourcing failure prevention 
purpose. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like other studies, this one has its 
limitations. Essentially, this study focused 
on youth sport to understand amateur sport 
and its use of outsourcing by centering on 
CORC. The results of this study may be 
different from other amateur sport, like that 
of high school or other types of community 
based adult sports leagues. Future research 
on such other types of amateur sport could 
enhance the understanding of outsourcing 
in amateur sport. In addition, the three 
CORC used in this study are all from the 
same northeastern state, so further 
examination of CORC from different states 
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with different sizes of population, levels of 
household income, and a city budget could 
help to significantly contribute to the body 
of literature by providing a more 
comprehensive study of current outsourcing 
in amateur sport.  
 
Conclusion 
This case study examined YSP and the 
contemporary business nature of amateur 
sport by focusing on outsourcing as a 
business strategy. Whereas this case study is 
exploratory, its intent is to create academic 
attention and promote further examination 
from a field that has been receiving little to 
no academic attention. This study provided 
academic and practical implications for 
sport managers from the CORC who 
should be knowledgeable about 
contemporary phenomenon and future 
trend as to outsourcing. Certainly 
outsourcing in amateur sport as a serious 
academic area of study needs to be 
researched further, and this study provided 
initial steps for that journey.  
--- 
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Tables 
Table 1 
 
City Profile 
Source: United States Census Bureau. 
 
 
 
 
  
Cases   Year 2014 Estimated 
Population 
 
Population Percentage 
Change (Year 2010 – 
Year 2014) 
Median Household Income 
(Year 2009-2013) 
Case 1 17,527 -0.3% $54,225 
Case 2 34,604 +1.0% $63,924 
Case 3 26,523 -0.5% $53,586 
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Table 2 
 
City Profile 
 
  
Cases   Outsourcing Risk 
 
Outsourcing Risk 
Mitigation Plans 
Outsourcing Mitigation 
Satisfaction 
Case 1 Low Monitoring, 
Communication, 
Contract Details 
 
High 
Case 2 Extremely Low Monitoring, 
Communication 
 
High 
Case 3 Extremely Low Monitoring, 
Communication 
High 
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Table 3 
 
Example of Case 1 YSP Outsourcing Revenue 
 
 
  
 FY2014 
Revenue 
(% of 
Revenue) 
FY2013 
Revenue 
(% of 
Revenue) 
FY2012 
Revenue 
(% of 
Revenue) 
FY2011 
Revenue 
(% of Revenue) 
YSP 
Outsourcing 
 
$14,270 
(1.07%) 
$17,344 
(1.19%) 
$17,160 
(1.19%) 
$16,836 
(1.17%) 
YSP In-House 
 
 
$33,985 
(2.54%) 
$36,924 
(2.53%) 
$26,082 
(1.81%) 
$41,330 
(2.88%) 
Total $50,369 
(3.61%) 
$56,281 
(3.71%) 
$45,254 
(3.00%) 
$60,177 
(4.05%) 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
 
Economic and Strategic Management View in Amateur Sport Outsourcing 
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